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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the characteristics of an inflation targeting 
monetary policy, using the Barro-Gordon model specific tools. This paper uses the initial Barro-
Gordon concepts of inflationary social costs and benefits, adding a new dimension generated by the 
cost of output deviating from the potential level. The main contribution of this paper is the 
exhaustive study of the time inconsistency problem generated by the very existence of a 
policymaker-established inflation rate. The mathematic simulation of a more complex model than 
Robert Barro and David Gordon’s model from 1983 allowed a complete analysis of several 
parameters’ influence (parameters such as the optimal rate of inflation, the discount rate, the 
importance structure of inflationary social cost) on the appliable range of the target inflation rate, 
range that guarantees that the policymakers have no incentive to break their own rules, or at least 
this incentive is somewhat inferior to the future cost of doing so. 
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Inflationary costs function 
 
 In the first chapter of this paper, we have elaborated a mathematical function for inflationary 
costs, altogether with a policymaker reaction function to the private agents’ inflationary 
expectations as well as the optimal inflation rate. 
 Inflation is generally viewed as one negative monetary phenomenon, due to its tendency to 
distort the economic processes in one country by the reallocation of income (more or less arbitrary), 
by generating a general state of uncertainty at macroeconomic level that may limit the capital 
investment (both foreign and national), and finally the general state of private agents’ distrust in the 
national currency. Through this paper, though, we will not assume that inflation is only a negative 
economic process, as it is generally known that zero inflation may be considered a lack of economic 
growth. Furthermore, as the Barro-Gordon model suggests, it is not rational for the private agents to 
expect a zero level of inflation1. 
One first inflationary cost to be analyzed is the difference between the present inflation rate 
(rip) and the optimal inflation rate (ri*). Therefore, 2*1 )(2 i
p
i rr
aC −⋅=         (1)      
                                                 
1 R.J. Barro, D.B Gordon, “Rules, Discretion and Reputation In a Model Of Monetary Policy”, 1983 
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 The “a” parameter is greater than zero and represents the relative importance of this 
particular inflationary cost in the general structure of inflationary costs2. The higher the present 
inflation rate is compared to the optimal one, the higher the social cost will be. 
 Another inflationary cost is generated by the difference between the present unemployment 
rate and NAIRU, a difference that, through Okun’s law, may be correlated with the difference 
between the present output and the potential one, as follows: 
           ( )2*2 YYbC p −⋅=                                                                                         (2) 
(Where b is greater than zero, suggesting the relative importance of the output differential 
inflationary cost in the general structure of inflationary costs). 
 As the real output ( pY ) is more different from the potential one (
*Y ), the resources will be in 
a greater degree misused at macroeconomic level, fact which will generate a certain variation of the 
inflation rate from its target. To formalize this second cost and express it as depending of the 
inflation rate, we have used an expectation function stated by Lucas (1981): 
             )(* ai
p
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Lucas considers that the output gap is directly related to the differential between the present 
inflation rate and the expected one. Combining equations (2) and (3) we derive a mathematical 
formalization of a second inflationary cost (depending on the public expectations regarding the 
inflation rate): 
 ( )222 aipi rrbcC −⋅=                                                                                                             (4) 
 Adding the (1) equation to (4) we obtain a total inflationary cost (C): 
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 A potential benefit from high inflation can result from the reduction of the public debt’s real 
value. As the present inflation rate is higher than the expected one, the public debt instruments’ 
yields will appear much more appealing to the private agents than they will be in reality. From this 
point of view, we can analyze a specific inflationary benefit gained by the government: 
 
            )( ai
p
i rrdB −⋅=                              (6) 
 (d is greater than zero, suggesting the relative importance of the inflationary benefit). 
   
  Costain (2004) elaborates a mathematical function of the general inflationary cost, 
considering that a more precise formalization will take into account the negative inflationary cost 
represented by the aforementioned benefit (6). Thus, we will express the general inflationary cost as 
in (7) for the rest of the paper: 
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The Central Bank’s reaction function 
 
                                                 
2 Using a/2 instead of a leads to simpler further arithmetics 
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 Every Central Bank’s objective is to minimise the inflationary cost, by reducing the standard 
deviation of present inflation rate from the optimum level and from the private agents’ expected 
inflation level. The only directly controllable parameter by a monetary authority is the present 
inflation rate: rip. The expected inflation rate can only be indirectly influenced by the previous 
Central Bank’s actions and its general level credibility (as related to the price stability goal). 
Minimising the total inflationary cost, we will obtain: 
0
*
=∂
∂
p
ir
C ⇒ 0)(2)( 2* =−−⋅+−⋅ drrbcrra aipiipi  
  
 Rearranging, we obtain a Central Bank’s reaction function of the present inflation rate: 
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 Thus, the inflation rate that leads to a minimal inflationary cost depends on the expected 
inflationary rate. Furthermore, as the optimal inflation rate is higher, the Central Bank will have 
incentives to set a higher inflation rate. Under these conditions, the policymaker will have 
incentives not to take steps in order to reduce inflation, as the real public debt will decrease. If the 
Central Bank’s decision to set the inflation rate to zero is credible, then the inflation rate that leads 
to the minimum level of inflationary costs will be positive, which leads to the conclusion that it is 
irrational for the private agents to expect a zero level of inflation: 
2
*
2bca
drar ipi +
+⋅= > 0 (9) 
 
The Central Bank’s reaction function demonstrates that a present inflation rate higher than 
the optimal one will lead to a contractionary monetary policy that will result in decreasing inflation 
rate expectations. Costain (2004) imagined three basic scenarios of analyzing the private agents’ 
inflationary expectations, scenarios that we used in order to compare the inflationary costs. 
  
a) The Central Bank announces the optimal inflation rate to be applied 
 
We assume that this inflation target is credible for the private agents. Under these 
conditions, the expectations are equal to the optimal rate: rai=r*i, and the reaction function will 
consequently be: 
 2
*
2bca
drr i
p
i ++=       (10) 
When the expected inflation rate is equal to the optimal one, the present inflation rate will be 
greater than the optimal one. Replacing (1.10) in the inflationary costs equation (1.7) we obtain: 
 
0
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In this case, the inflationary cost has a negative value; in fact it represents a social benefit. 
The reason behind this is the reduced level of taxes due to a lower level of real public debt. 
Furthermore, an inflation rate higher than the optimal level leads to a higher economic output than 
the potential one, resulting in a lower unemployment rate compared to NAIRU. 
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b) The private agents have rational expectations 
 
This scenario studies the situation where the private agents’ expectations can be considered 
rational. If they would expect an inflation rate equal to zero, then the Central Bank will set a 
positive inflation rate, so this expectation level is not rational. Furthermore, if the expectations will 
equal the optimal rate of inflation, the Central Bank will set the inflation rate according to the first 
scenario, so this expectation will not be a rational choice either. To conclude, the expected rate of 
inflation can be considered rational if the private agents will accurately foresee the policymaker’s 
intention (the present inflation rate): rai= rpi. 
Generally speaking, the economists consider that the private agents act rationally when they 
accurately foresee the rational choices of other economic agents. Regarding inflation, the rational 
expectations equilibrium occurs when the Central Bank’s inflation rate choice is resulted from the 
reaction function and the private agents expect the very same inflation rate. (rai= rpi): 
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From the previous equation we obtain an expression of the inflation rate given the private 
agents’ rational expectations: 
a
drr i
p
i += *   (13) 
 From (13) we find that the rational expectations inflation rate (rpi) is higher than the optimal 
inflation rate. This is true in the hypothesis that the Central Bank will set an inflation rate higher 
than the expectations (the Barro-Gordon model hypothesis). Therefore, expecting the optimal 
inflation rate will lead to the actual inflation rate from the first scenario. Furthermore, rational 
anticipation of the Central Bank’s behavior will lead to second scenario’s inflation rate. 
Consequently, the inflation rate resulting from the second scenario will be higher than the one in the 
first scenario, as shown in (14): 
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The two inflation rates (from the first and second scenario) will be equal when the benefits 
of the lower public debt are very low, the case of a non-zero, low rate of inflation. 
Due to rationality of expectations, private agents are as aware of the real economic evolution 
as the Central Bank is and consequently, if the Central Bank targets an unemployment rate different 
from NAIRU, while announcing a zero inflation target, the latter is not credible (as private agents 
expect a positive inflation rate, high enough to considerably influence the unemployment rate). 
The inflationary cost function for the second scenario presents as follows: 
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 There is a social loss due to the inflation rate higher than the optimal one. Comparing the 
two scenarios from the inflationary costs criteria, we notice that the higher cost occurs in the 
rational expectations scenario when the Central Bank’s targets credibility is evaluated by the private 
agents. One possibility to reduce this cost is the Central Bank’s consistent behavior in targeting a 
credible monetary policy rule. 
  
c) Setting an inflation rate target rule 
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We assume that the Central Bank targets a low differential between the present inflation rate 
and the optimal one. The price stability target is of uttermost importance, the Central Bank 
neglecting the importance of the output differential. Therefore, the Central Bank will apply an 
optimal inflation targeting strategy.  The private agents will expect exactly the amount of inflation 
targeted by the Central Bank, and the present inflation rate, the expected and the optimal one will be 
equal: rai= rpi= ri*. One important additional condition for the existence of the aforementioned 
equality is represented by a fiscal policy consistent with the Central Bank’s monetary policy 
(although the benefits from the lower public debt will decrease). 
The inflationary costs function for this third scenario will consequently be: 
.0)()(*)(
2
)3( 222* =−⋅−−⋅+−⋅= aipiaipiipi rrdrrbcrrascenarioC                  (16) 
Comparing the three scenarios, we will obtain that rpi (scenario 2).> rpi (scenario 1)> rpi 
(scenario 3) = r*i.  Therefore, as long as the Central Bank has discretion over the inflation rate the 
differential between the present inflation rate and private agents’ expectations will be positive. This 
is the hypothesis that the policymaker has the incentive to deceive the private agents and is higher in 
the rational expectations scenario. A welfare-based comparative analysis of the inflationary costs 
from all three scenarios will show the following result: 
 
C*(scenario 2)   > C*(scenario 3) =0 > C*(scenario 1)                                               (17) 
      (Loss)                                                (Gain) 
 
The most beneficial scenario will therefore be the first one, but it is not applicable in the 
long run. The Central Bank may succeed in deceiving the private agents only for a limited period, 
but in the long run, the private agents will anticipate this behavior. Therefore the Central Bank has 
only two viable options: setting an inflation rate rule or choosing the inflation rate according to the 
reaction function. If it chooses discretion rather than rule, then the economy will face a social loss 
(scenario 2 – rational expectations). Otherwise, following an inflation rate rule, there will be no 
social losses or no social gains. 
  
The Problem of Dynamic Inconsistency When Approaching the Monetary Policies 
  
   In the previous subchapter, we have analyzed the importance of anticipating the private 
economic agents upon the inflation rate, which will be adopted by the monetary authorities, by 
analyzing the possible scenarios, which could take place in such a situation. If, on a short term, the 
population’s misleading, through promises regarding the adoption of the optimal inflation rate, can 
yield a social benefit (a negative cost), on a long term, because of the central authority’s loss in 
reputation, only the adoption of rule of targeting the inflation can diminish the social cost3. 
However, adopting a rule represents a disadvantage solution regarding the moral hazard. The 
compliance with a rule does not represent a certainty for any economic agent, especially under the 
terms in which its non-compliance would bring a certain short-term social benefit compared to case 
in which the inflation rate would be the ex-ante established one. The other side is represented by the 
future cost of this decision, a supplementary cost which occurs because of the authority’s loss in 
reputation and because of the modifications in the economic agents’ expectances. In case the central 
bank, which follows a strategy of targeting the inflation, does not obtain a legal current inflation 
                                                 
3 The inflation rate rule would suppose a cost during all the periods of time. 
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with a target (or which could be in compliance with the foreseen fluctuation interval), then its 
credibility will get diminished and the result of this fact will be the intensifications in the future 
inflationary anticipations. 
 Modeling the economic agents’ behavior during the period t, according to the compliance or 
the non-compliance with the inflation targeting during the period t-1, the following system will be 
obtained: 
 ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ≠⇔=
=⇔=
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              (18) 
 We have noted with ri* the inflation rate targeting, proposed by the monetary authority. 
Thus, the system (1.18.) will be explained as it follows: if, during the previous period, the effective / 
current inflation rate corresponds to the population’s expectances, and automatically to the target, 
the expectances for the current period will be equal to that target. Otherwise, the central bank loses 
its reputation and the anticipations will modify, following the scenario of the rational expectances.  
 
The temptation of non-complying with the rule – mathematic formalization 
 
 We shall note the temptation of non-complying with rule of inflation rate (ri*) with T and we 
shall consider a function, depending on the inflation targeting. The temptation of non-complying 
with the target will be equal to the social cost corresponding to applying this rule, out of which we 
subtract the social cost of its non-compliance. The bigger this difference is, the more the stimuli to 
ignore the rule get increased. According to the relation 7, and taking into account the fact that the 
economic agents’ expectations are equal to the inflation rate target, the cost of the compliance with 
the rule will be equal to: 
  2** )*(
2 i
rule rr
aC −⋅=       (19) 
  
 
On the other hand, the private economic agents’ disappointment will have as a result another 
cost, that of the compliance with the inflation targeting. This one is formed on the basis of a current 
inflation rate which differs from the rule and, according to the expectations (in case the expectances 
correspond to the inflation targeting), according to the equation (8): 
 2
*2*
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 Thus, the cost of non-compliance with the rule, under the terms of the expectances 
corresponding to the rule, is as it follows: 
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 Accordingly, the temptation of non-complying with the rule according to the inflation rate 
which represents the rule will be as it follows: 
 
 compliancenonrulei CCrT −−= **# )(                                             (22) 
 
The updated future cost – mathematic formalization 
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 We shall note the updated future cost of the non-compliance with the inflation rate rule with 
CVS and we shall consider it, as in the temptation case, to be dependant to the inflation rate rule. 
 The updated future cost can be treated as a difference between the future social costs, in the 
case in which the rule had been complied with in the present, everything updated with an inter-bank 
interest rate (r). 
 In the future period, in case the rule would have not been complied with in the present, 
according to the system (18) which explains the anticipation choices of the economic agents, the 
social cost (not updated up for the present moment) will follow the reasonability scenario presented 
in the previous subchapter and it will be as it follows:  
 a
dC fuutrecompliancenon 2
2
=−                          (23) 
 The future social cost of the compliance with the rule (not updated) will be equal to the cost 
of the compliance with the rule calculated according to the equation 1.19., because of the fact that 
neither of the conditions modifies.4 Thus, updating of the future cost to the interest rate we shall 
obtain another function of ri* corresponding to this value: 
 )(
1
1*)( *rule
future
compliancenoni CCr
rCVA −+= −      (24) 
 After defining the terms of temptation of non-complying with the rule and of future updated 
cost, it is relatively simple to estimate that an inflation rate targeting is applicable only in case the 
temptation of non-complying with it is inferior to the future updated cost of this action. Otherwise, 
the authorities will always be stimulated not to comply with their own decisions, because the 
current benefit will always be superior to the future loss, but such a behavior cannot be assimilated 
to a rule and the result will be that of irrecoverable credibility losses of the monetary authority.
 Thus, in order that an inflation rate rule ( *ir ) could be considered as applicable, the 
following condition must be complied with: 
 *)()( * ii rTrCVA ≥                                                                 (25) 
 
Is the optimal inflation rate an applicable rule? 
 
 First of all, we shall verify if the optimal inflation rate (ri*) is applicable in an economy in 
case of the current temptation – future updated cost. If the rule is complied with, than the current 
inflation rate, as well as the population’s expectances and the optimal inflation rate are equal, and 
this will lead to a null social cost, according to the equation (1.7.). 
  
 0** =⇒== ruleaiipi Crrr      (26) 
  
 If the rule is not complied with, the current inflation rate can be calculated according to the 
relation 1.20., under the terms in which the inflation targeting will be equal to the optimal inflation: 
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*
2
*2*
1
/ 22
2
bca
dr
bca
drbcrar iii
p
compliancenoni ++=+
+⋅+⋅=−      (27) 
                                                 
4 Moreover, it is more than obvious that, in case of complying with the social costs rule in not updated terms, they will 
be equal for any period of time. 
8 
 
 The obtained result corresponds to the first scenario which has been analyzed in the previous 
chapter (the population’s expectances were equal to the optimal inflation); the cost of the non-
compliance is negative and it has the following form: 
)2(2 2
2
*
bca
dC compliancenon +−=−                                                                                                (28) 
According to the equation 1.25., the temptation of not-complying with a rule of the inflation, 
equal to the optimal inflation, will be as it follows: 
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 On the other hand, the future updated cost will be equal to: 
 
ara
d
a
d
r
CC
r
rCVA rule
future
compliancenoni 22
)0
2
(
1
1)(
1
1)(
22
**
+=−+=−+= −   (30) 
The optimal inflation rate will be considered as an inflation targeting if the following 
inequality, deduced from the equation 1.25., will be complied with: 
 arbc >22       (31) 
 Taking into account the significance of the positive parameters “a”,”b”,”c”, the previous 
inequality can be rearranged as it follows: 
 
22
2 arabc >>        (32) 
 
In the function of the inflation social cost, bc2 represents the importance of the cost of the 
output gap according to the Lucas function, and (a/2) represents the importance of the costs of 
redistributing the incomes generated by the variation in the inflation rate compared to the optimal 
rate. From the previous inequality, it results that the optimal inflation rate is estimated as being 
superior to the importance of the costs of redistributing the incomes, supposition which is very 
difficult to be made in the modern economies, where the governors’ attention, and especially the 
audience’s attention, directs towards the second inflation cost factor. 
 
 
Analysis of several parameters influencing the enforceable inflation rate interval. 
 
 To discuss this economic model we have built the mathematic functions of present 
temptation to disregard the rule and the future costs of disregarding the inflation rate regulation 
(equations 29 and 30). 
 The software application MATLAB was used in order to simulate different scenarios and to 
analyze the influence of several parameters: the relative importance of income redistribution cost, 
output gap social costs, and benefits resulting from lower public debt; discount rates and optimal 
inflation rate. 
 The primary model 
  
 The framework of our model consisted of Romania’s monetary policy coordinates for early 
2008: an optimal inflation rate of 5,9% and a discount rate of 9,5% - the monetary policy interest 
rate set by NBR in March 2008. For the parameters a (the relative importance of income 
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redistribution inflationary cost), b and c (the relative importance of output gap inflationary cost), d 
(the relative importance of the public debt downsizing inflationary benefit) we have chosen positive 
values5. 
 The result of the simulation was that the enforceable rate of inflation, therefore a credible 
inflation rate rule should be greater than 5,47% and lower than 8,41%. The size of this interval, as 
well as its sensitivity to different parameters variation was analyzed through further simulations 
using the 22 and 24 equations.  
 
 
Figure 1 The model results for ri*=5,9%,r=9,5% 
  
Discount rate fluctuations 
  
 Increasing the discount rate6 from 9,5% to 12% will result in the increase of the minimum 
appliable inflation rate rule by almost 0,03 percentage points. Therefore, the minimum enforceable 
rate is rather not sensitive to the discount rate fluctuations, even to a fluctuation relatively ample 
such as the one chosen in the model (more than 26%). Also, increasing the discount rate will lead to 
higher updated costs according to equation 30, thus intersecting the temptation function at a higher 
minimum enforceable inflation rate. 
 On the other hand, the superior limit of the enforceable inflation rate interval remains 
constant at a value of 8,41% (the primary model value), which allows us to conclude that the 
discount rate variations have little to no influence over the maximum level of appliable inflation rate 
rule.  
                                                 
5 We have chosen: a=0.4, b=0.7, c=0.4, d=0.01.These values comply with other policymaker’s reaction estimates (such 
as the Taylor rule), the relative importance of income redistribution being greater than the output gap inflationary cost.  
 
6 Under caeteris paribus hypothesis relative to the primary model 
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 Combining the two effects depicted above, we can derive another conclusion: the 
downsizing of the enforceable inflation rate rule interval as the result of an discount rate increase. 
 Therefore, a restrictive monetary policy applied by rising interest rates will diminish the 
policymaker’s choice of enforceable inflation rate.Furthermore, as we can observe in Figure 3, the 
future costs of disregarding the rule will decline sharply, increasing the policymaker’s incentive of 
not respecting the enforced rule. Even so, the maximum enforceable rate is higher than the inflation 
target (the optimal inflation rate). 
  
 
 
Figure 2 Increase of the discount rate 
 
Fluctuations in the relative importance of income redistribution inflationary cost 
 
 This situation presents the case when, at macroeconomic level, the relative importance of 
income redistribution inflationary cost is significantly increased. To include this variation in the 
simulation, we have increased by 50% the value of parameter a from the inflationary costs function. 
 As it can be observed in Figure 3, there is a relatively small rise in the minimum enforceable 
inflation rate from 5,47% in the primary model to 5,72%. 
 On the other hand, the maximum appliable inflation rate rule is more elastic to this 
influence, and the relation to the importance of income redistribution is negative: the superior limit 
of the enforceable interval drops from an initial 8,41% in the primary model to 7,58% in this case. 
The tendency is natural: as inflation becomes more and more socially costly, the policymakers will 
have an incentive to set lower inflation targets. 
 Furthermore, as the decrease in the maximum enforceable rate is higher than the increase in 
the minimum value of the enforceable interval, the size of the appliable inflation rates interval is 
reduced to a value under 2 percentage points, leaving little option for the policymaker to set an 
enforceable inflation rule. 
 Due to the fact that inflation becomes more socially costly, the present temptation at 
equilibrum (Figure 3) will be considerably reduced relative to the primary model. 
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Figure 3 Rise in the relative importance of income redistribution inflationary cost 
 
 
Fluctuations in the relative importance of output gap inflationary cost 
 
 Analyzing the case of a fluctuation in the relative importance of the output gap inflationary 
cost, we notice a relatively small influence of this factor over the model results. Our simulation 
consisted of increasing the relative importance of output gap by 50%, that meaning increasing the b 
parameter 1.5 times. 
 The minimum appliable inflation rate is negatively related to the output gap cost, but its 
elasticity is quite reduced: the minimum enforceable inflation rate drops from the primary model 
value only by 0.19 percentage points, meaning 3,47% of initial value. 
 The maximum enforceable inflation rate remains constant, caeteris paribus to the primary 
model: 8,41% (see Figure 4), thus resulting an increase of the enforceable inflation rate interval’s 
size. This situation is quite the opposite of the previous one, regarding the importance of the income 
redistribution cost.  
 Therefore, as the output gap becomes more important as an inflationary cost, the options a 
policymaker has to set an enforceable inflation rate rule increase, for the appliable interval is also 
larger. 
An increased importance of the output gap inflationary cost is helpful in analyzing the 
inflation targeting strategy. An excessive aggregate demand (on the background of an already 
existing inflationary output gap) will enhance the inflationary pressures, which stresses the 
necessity of coordinating the fiscal and monetary policies in order to respect the inflation rule. The 
restrictiveness of such policies will lead to disinflation, and the inflation rule/target can be set in a 
more credible way. 
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Figure 4 Rise in the relative importance of output gap inflationary cost 
 
Fluctuations in the relative importance of reduced public debt inflationary benefit 
  
 The last case analyzed in this paper is related to an increase of the relative importance of 
reduced public debt inflationary benefit, which is synonym at macroeconomic level with a reduced 
necessity for high taxes having a distorting effect over the economic activity. 
 Our simulation consisted of increasing the relative importance of reduced public debt benefit 
by 50%, that meaning increasing the d parameter 1.5 times. 
 The model results indicate a decrease in the minimum appliable inflation rate of 4.02% to a 
value of 5.25%. On the other hand, a spectaculous rise is to be noticed in the maximum enforceable 
rule: an increase of 12.93% to a value of 9,66 percentage points. 
 Explaining this result, we may conclude that while inflation is perceived as a “beneficial” 
phenomenon for a national economy – through reduced distorting taxes – the policymaker has the 
option of setting a higher inflation rate and enjoy the benefits of a reduced public debt. 
 Furthermore, the evolutions presented above lead to a consistent increase in the size of the 
appliable inflation rate rule interval, offering larger options for the policymakers in their attempt to 
set the inflation rate rule. 
 Also, if inflation is to be considered beneficial, we can also notice an important increase in 
the present temptation equilibrium level, increase that may reach 100% as represented in Figure 5. 
The Barro-Gordon model implies that a higher inflation rate leads to certain governmental 
benefits through the reduction of public debt. On the other hand, the government already is 
benefiting from high aggregate demand – and higher fiscal incomes – during the pre-election 
period. Therefore, if this situation happens on the background of inflationary output gap (such as in 
Romania) then there are high chances that the inflation rate target will not be achieved, as long as it 
is not set to a higher value. Concluding, to continue the process of disinflation, the coordination of 
monetary and fiscal policy is a sine qua non condition. Like in a Stackelberg equilibrium, a Central 
Bank with a inflation targeting strategy anticipates the governmental reaction, which is adjusted to 
the very same monetary policy. 
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Figure 5 Rise in the relative importance of reduced public debt inflationary benefit 
 
 To summarize the model conclusions, the influence of all analyzed parameters (optimal 
inflation rate, discount rate, inflationary costs and benefits importance), which we have considered 
independent variables, over dependent variables consisting of the enforceable inflation rate interval, 
we will build the following table. The following table is summarizing the Figures 1 to 5: depending 
on the values of present temptation and future updated cost we have shown the enforceable rate 
interval, which will guide a Central Bank’s actions to gain credibility. This interval is significantly 
influenced by the increases in the income redistribution inflationary cost and the public debt 
reduction inflationary benefit, the first leading to a lower maximum enforceable rate, whilst the 
latter to a higher one. 
   
    Dependent variables 
     
Minimum 
enforceable 
rate 
Maximum 
enforceable 
rate   
Size of 
enforceable 
interval 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Discount rate Directly related constant 
Negatively 
related 
C
os
ts
 
Income 
redistribution 
importance Directly related 
Negatively 
related 
Negatively 
related 
Output gap 
importance 
Negatively 
related constant Directly related 
B
en
ef
its
. 
Reduced public 
debt importance 
Negatively 
related Directly related Directly related 
  
Table  1 Influence of independent parameters over model’s dependent variables 
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Conclusions 
 
According to the Barro-Gordon model, adapted and tested throughout this paper, setting an 
inflation rate target represents the only possible choice to minimize the long-run social costs. The 
only viable alternative of the policymaker to reduce the social cost to zero is setting an inflation rate 
rule, which can be respected by using fiscal and monetary policy instruments. The fundamental 
problem of setting an inflation rate rule is respecting it, function to this compliance of the Central 
Bank to its own rule, there can be established a certain degree of credibility. This paper shows there 
is an interval of enforceable inflation rates which can be influenced both by specific inflationary 
costs parameters and monetary policy instruments. 
he simulations realized on Romania’s particular case show that the maximum enforceable 
inflation rate has a close value to the actual inflation rate from the first five months of 2008, but two 
percentage points above the inflation target set by NBR. The policymaker’s credibility shall 
improve only if there are set inflation targets superior to the precedent levels (for example, the 2008 
inflation target had been set to 3.8% eventually risen to 5.9-6%), but this behaviour will signify but 
an acknowledgement of the impossibility of continuing the disinflation trend. Further inflationary 
tendencies, like supply-side shocks at macroeconomic level will lead to failure in reaching the 
inflation target, negatively influencing the policymaker’s credibility. The only effective actions of 
the Central Bank are influencing the aggregate demand, but for greater effectiveness there is 
required a closer coordination with the fiscal policy. As our Barro-Gordon model simulation 
suggests, an increase of the relative importance of the output gap as well as putting an end to the 
expansionary fiscal policy during elections are necessary. If a Stackelberg equilibrium is to be 
reached between the Central Bank (acting as leader to set the target inflation) and the Government, 
there will result a restrictive policy mix, leading to the reduction of inflationary anticipations in the 
Romanian economy. 
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